The German UMAG of 22 September 2005 by Wooldridge, Frank
22
Amicus Curiae Issue 70 Summer 2007
The above law, the Gesetz zur Unternehensintegrtätund Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts(UMAG) contains a number of important
amendments to the German Aktiengesetz (AktG). The
lengthy title may be translated as the “Law Furthering
Corporate Integrity and the Modernisation of the Regime
Covering Shareholder Actions.” The most signiﬁcant
feature may well be the new paragraph 148 incorporated in
the AktG governing shareholders’ actions against directors
of public companies. The former more restrictive
provisions of paragraphs 147(3) and (4) AktG have been
repealed. Furthermore, UMAG provides for a new
electronic section of the Federal Bulletin, the use of which
may facilitate such actions and other kinds of corporate
litigation. In addition, UMAG also contains provisions
governing the identiﬁcation and authorisation of
shareholders for the purpose of meetings, which may be of
most signiﬁcance in the law of bearer shares, which are
very commonly used by German public companies.
Certain of its provisions are designed to restrict the
effect of the very extensive information rights available to
shareholders in German public companies, which have
sometimes been employed abusively. The UMAG also
endeavours to restrict the facility enjoyed by shareholders
to bring actions to declare decisions taken by the general
meeting void on the ground that they are in breach of
statutory provisions or the company’s articles. The UMAG
contains a number of other provisions as well, for example
in relation to special investigations (Sonderprüfungen), but
of its rather disparate provisions the aforementioned ones
appear the most important and are thus considered below.
ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST
DIRECTORS
The right to sue the members of management or
supervisory board of a public company for breaches of
their duties is governed by paragraphs 147 and 148 AktG.
If the action is against members of the management board,
the company is represented by the supervisory board. If it
is against members of the supervisory board, it is
represented by the management board. The former rules
contained in paragraph 147(1) concerning actions by
members for damages on behalf of the company against
managers were found to be unsatisfactory. They could be
brought by the holders of 10 per cent of the share capital
or persons holding share capital at least equivalent to €1
million. The holders of such shares were sometimes
represented on the supervisory board, and were often
satisﬁed with a settlement between the managers and the
supervisory board. The employer representatives on that
board sometimes also favoured such a settlement. The new
procedure under paragraph 148 may prove to be more
satisfactory.
This new procedure has a preliminary stage. A minority
consisting of the holders of 1 per cent of all the shares or a
nominal capital of at least €100,000 may invoke it, which
may result in direct shareholder litigation against the
company. It remains that the company may bring an action
against members of either board if the general meeting so
resolves by a simple majority.
Paragraph 148 AktG contains detailed rules governing
the permission of the court. Such permission will be
granted if certain requirements are satisﬁed. Shareholders
desirous of suing, or their predecessor in title, must have
acquired the shares before they became aware of the
alleged breach of duty or alleged damage. Furthermore,
they must have endeavoured to induce the company to sue
the defaulting ofﬁcers before they make an application to
the court. In addition, the relevant facts must give rise to
the suspicion that there has been dishonest conduct or a
serious breach of the articles which has caused damages to
the company. Furthermore, there must be no overriding
grounds based on the welfare of the company for not
bringing an action against the company’s relevant ofﬁcers.
If the former requirements are satisﬁed the court will allow
a direct action by the shareholders against ofﬁcers of the
company. The competent court is the Landgericht in the
territory in which the company has its seat.
The former rules governing costs contained in
paragraph 147(4) AktG, which has been repealed,
discouraged potential plaintiffs from bringing actions. The
new provisions of paragraph 148(6) AktG concerning costs
are quite complex. According to paragraph 148(6), the
costs of the preliminary procedure have to be borne by the
plaintiff, to the extent that a request to bring proceedings
is rejected. However, if such rejection is based on
considerations of the welfare of the company, which ought
to have, but have not, been mentioned by it before the
proceedings began, the company must pay the plaintiff ’s
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costs. The allocation of costs is decided upon in the ﬁnal
judgment of the court. If the company brings the action
itself or takes over an identical action brought by the
shareholders, it bears the costs of bringing the action, or
those incurred by the shareholder. If the action is
dismissed wholly or partially the company has to reimburse
the plaintiffs for their costs provided that they were not
granted permission to bring the action by deliberately or
grossly negligently making incorrect statements.
The new provisions governing derivative actions appear
generally balanced and cautious. The use of the procedures
provided for in paragraph 148 AktG may be furthered by
those of paragraph 127a AktG, which was also
incorporated in the Aktiengesetz by UMAG. The latter
provision stipulates that shareholders or groups of
shareholders may place a notice in the electronic version of
the Federal Bulletin with the intention of inducing other
shareholders either collectively or with the help of an
authorized representative, to make a submission or a claim
under the AktG, or to use their voting rights at a general
meeting in a particular way. The invitation to the
shareholders must contain certain required particulars, and
may mention the internet site of the claimants and their
electronic addresses. The company may place a rejoinder
to the invitation which has been made in the electronic
version of the Federal Legal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). The
relevant information might involve giving notice of the
intention of the shareholders to pursue a preliminary
procedure under Article 148, to initiate a special
investigation (Sonderprüfung) of certain managerial
conduct, or to propose a vote on a particular topic at a
shareholders’ meeting (see V Noack and Z Zetzsche,
“Corporate governance reform in Germany”, 16 EBL Rev
(2005), p1033 at p1052 in this sense).
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHORISATION OF
SHAREHOLDERS FOR MEETINGS
The recent statute abolishes the old system of
Hinterlegung, which had long been a feature of German
law, and which was referred to in the relevant provisions of
the Aktiengesetz of 1965. This system originally involved
the deposit of the share certiﬁcate, but in recent years it
has come to mean the certiﬁcation of ownership of the
relevant shares by the depository banks which hold them.
The principal changes to the formerly existing rules set out
in new paragraphs 123(1) AktG, which have been
incorporated therein by UMAG. Paragraph 123(1)
provides that the general meeting must be summoned at
least 30 days before the date of the meeting, and only
makes minor changes to the previously existing rules.
The provisions of new paragraph 123(2) are more
complex. The ﬁrst sentence of this text provides that the
articles may make participation in a general meeting or the
exercise of voting rights thereat dependent on the
shareholder having given notice to attend. According to the
second sentence of this subparagraph, if the articles
contain such a provision, the date by which the
shareholders are to give prior notice of their intention to
attend shall be substituted for the date of the meeting, for
the purpose of determining the period of notice, unless the
articles provide for a shorter time period. Finally,
paragraph 123(2) provides that the notiﬁcation concerning
the shareholders must be received by the company at its
appropriate address at the latest seven days before the
meeting, unless the articles prescribe a shorter time period.
The provisions of the paragraph 123(3) are more
complex than those of paragraph 123(2), and of
considerable practical importance. This text provides that
as far as bearer shares are concerned, the articles may
provide how the entitlement of the holders to participate
in meetings or to use their voting rights shall be evidenced:
in such an event, paragraph 123(2) applies by way of
analogy. Furthermore, article 123(3) provides that in the
case of companies with a stock exchange listing, a notice in
a textual form provided by the depository institution shall
be sufﬁcient evidence of relevant entitlement. In addition,
in the case of such listed companies, evidence of ownership
of shares at the beginning of the 21st day before the
meeting must be provided by depository banks and must
reach the company at the appropriate depository address
at least seven days before the meeting, unless the
company’s articles provide for a shorter period. Finally,
paragraph 123(3) provides that participation in and voting
at the general meeting is only open to a shareholder who
has provided the required evidence. The record date of
ownership of at least 21 days before the meeting is thus of
very considerable importance.
CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON
SHAREHOLDERS’ INFORMATION RIGHTS
Shareholders in a German public company are given
very extensive information rights by paragraph 131(2)
AktG; they may however be refused information on the
grounds set out in article 131(3). It has been contended
that the shareholders’ right to information has sometimes
been abused in recent years, especially for the purpose of
initiating shareholders’ actions (V Noack and D Zetzsche,
op cit, p 1044). In order to limit the number of questions
asked by shareholders, which must be answered by the
management board at the general meeting if they concern
the company’s affairs, and the required information is
necessary to permit a proper evaluation of an item on the
agenda, UMAG contains a provision incorporating a new
paragraph 132(3), sentence 7, in the Aktiengesetz. This
provision stipulates that the management board may refuse
to provide information where it is available on the
company’s internet site at least seven days before the
general meeting and is generally accessible throughout that
meeting.
Furthermore, paragraph 243 (4) provides that a
resolution of the general meeting can only be set aside by 23
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reason of the provision of incomplete or inaccurate
information, or for failure to provide information if a
shareholder exercising objective judgment would have
regarded the provision of such information as essential for
the evaluation of his rights of membership and
participation in the company. Paragraph 243(4) also
provides that the provision of inaccurate or incomplete
information or the failure to provide information in the
general meeting about the determination of the amount, or
appropriateness of compensation, payments by way of
settlement, additional payments, or other types of
payment, cannot form the basis of an attempt to avoid a
resolution where there is statutory provision for a special
administrative procedure (Spruchverfahren) in the case of
a dispute. Such a procedure is sometimes available in
disputes relating to shareholders’ rights in the content of
groups of companies.
OTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE AVOIDANCE
OF SHAREHOLDERS’ RESOLUTIONS
As indicated above, a resolution of a shareholders’
meeting may be avoided by means of an action based upon
the law or the articles. It has already been shown that
paragraph 243(4) AktG contains certain exceptions to this
rule. The avoidance of shareholders’ resolutions has
sometimes given rise to prolonged disputes in the past
which have not always proved beneﬁcial to German public
companies.
A further limitation on the avoidance of certain such
resolutions is contained in paragraph 246a AktG, as
inserted therein by UMAG. By paragraph 246a(1), if the
resolution of a general meeting governing the provision of
capital, its reduction, or the conclusion of an enterprise
agreement is subject to an action to avoid it brought in the
competent court (the district court or Landgericht), the
court may make an order providing that the bringing of the
action shall not preclude the registration of the resolution,
and that any defects in the resolution shall not affect the
operation of such registration. It is noteworthy that the
avoidance of the particular types of resolution mentioned
in paragraph 246(a)(1) may sometimes have a particularly
detrimental effect on the company and its shareholders.
By paragraph 246a(2) AktG the court may only make
such an order when the action to avoid the resolution is
clearly groundless, or impermissible, or when the
immediate working of the contested resolution is
according to the court’s independent connection
appropriate to safeguard the company and its shareholders
from substantial harm. Account must be taken by the court
of the seriousness of the breaches alleged in the action to
amend the resolution. It is necessary to demonstrate and
prove facts on the basis of which the order may be made.
An appeal lies to the Regional Appeal Court
(Oberlandesgericht) against the decision of the district
court (Landgericht).
According to paragraph 246a(3) AktG, the order should
be made within three months of being requested. If the
Landgericht (court of ﬁrst instance) determines that the
resolution and the measures therein shall take effect, and if
the resolution is found to be illegal by the Regional Appeal
Court, it follows from article 246(a)(4) AktG that the
claimant is entitled to damages, but the relevant measure
will be treated as valid in accordance with the preliminary
judgment. The preliminary procedure by which the
Landgericht decides whether the management may
challenge the measure must be completed within a period
of three months.
The statute considered in the present short article makes
a number of piecemeal changes in German law and seems
to have been inﬂuenced by domestic pressure rather than
any Community measures or recommendations. It should
help overcome the difﬁculties experienced in bringing a
derivative action against ofﬁcers of a German public
company which have received much attention in recent
years. The new provisions governing the costs of such
actions will probably be welcomed. The limitation placed
on the powers of the general meeting will restrict the
possibility of abuses of power by this organ. The rather
complex rules restricting the general meeting’s power to
avoid certain resolutions are designed to prevent the undue
protraction or frustration of certain common transactions,
and appear in principle to be justiﬁed. UMAG is one of the
many recent German statutes which have made import ant
changes to German company law. These changes have been
made in a rather unstructured fashion, and nothing so
ambitious as the UK Company Law Act 2006 has been
enacted in that country.
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